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The Medium Is the Archive
Enrico Terrone
There has been much discussion about how digital technologies have
changed the media. In this paper I will propose a reflection on how
digital technologies can also deeply modify our conception of the media.
In particular, I will show how digital technologies challenge a number
of conceptual distinctions that underlie, almost as dogmas, most
current discussions on media. I will analyse and criticise the following
dogmatic distinctions: communication / recording; medium / archive;
vehicle / store; act / object; content / form.
1 Communication / Recording
Media theory has emerged as a theory of communication, with oral
language and conversation as paradigms. In this theoretical framework,
recording has generally been treated as a secondary moment, as a
secondary function with respect to communication.
This priority of communication characterises the two theories of
communication that are perhaps the most influential of the twentieth
century: Austin’s and Searle’s linguistic pragmatics on the AngloSaxon analytical side; Saussure’s, Barthes’ and Metz’s semiotics on
the francophone continental side (but one could also mention, in
German culture, Gadamer’s hermeneutics or Habermas’s theory
of communicative action). In these theories, communication is
fundamentally conceived as a transfer of thoughts from one mind to
another by means of a language, which functions as a perfect mediator:
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reliable and transparent.

Film, with its dependence on a technological device and with
its ontological vocation to record reality, at first was an exception to
this rule, but semiotic and pragmatic approaches have contributed to
include the domain of communication. For film, understood in general
as the medium of motion pictures, lies at the very boundary between
communication and recording, I will treat it as our main example in
this paper.

In his critique of semiotics (in the essay ‘Le puits et la pyramide.
Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel’) and pragmatics (in the essay
‘Signature, événement, contexte’), Jacques Derrida (1972) has criticised
the perfect transparency and autonomy of the linguistic medium,
showing that these are nothing but an illusory effect produced by the
transient and evanescent substance of the human voice. Indeed, as
Derrida (1967b) himself argues, language, just like thought, cannot do
without some material support, because language and thought require
memory, which requires matter. In Aristotelian terms, one might say
that, although language and thought may appear as pure actuality, they
rely on memory, which is instead pure potentiality, and potentiality
means matter.

Thus, against a conception of communication as a linear transfer
of thoughts, Derrida (1967a, 1967b, 1972, and 1995) emphasises the
mediating role of the material object, which may be the sound of the
voice or writing or another transcription technique. In this way, the
recording is no longer a mere appendix of communication, but becomes
an active part of its process.

As pointed out by Maurizio Ferraris (2009), Derrida’s intuition
has been vividly confirmed by the diffusion of the digital medium,
whose structural features contradict the illusory transparency of the
oral language (as well as that of television as a medium), making it
much more similar to writing and film. The digital revolution upsets
the distinction between recording and communication, and unifies
the two domains. That is to say, while we communicate, we record;
and while we record, we communicate. For example, sending an SMS
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or an e-mail is communicating and at the same time recording what
has been communicated; symmetrically, uploading files on a network
amounts to recording and at the same time communicates what has been
recorded. Likewise, Facebook is a communication space that records
everything that is communicated, while YouTube is a recording space
that communicates everything that is recorded.

Digital technologies thus reveal that communication and recording
are not two different processes, but rather two different ways of
describing the same process. Assuming that communication is an act
by which a thought is transferred from one mind to another (we shall
see later how much this statement is questionable), this act requires
the production of an object, which implies a recording (in the case of
writing) or at least the possibility of recording (in the case of the voice).
In the process of communication, such an object is as crucial as the act.
2 Medium / Archive
On the one hand, the medium is generally conceived of as a system of
techniques and practices by which information passes from the sender
to the recipient. On the other hand, the archive is defined as a system
of techniques and practices by which information is stored. The notion
of archive is traditionally subordinated to that of medium, in the same
way that recording is subordinated to communication. The medium
is considered the place of living communication, while the archive is
considered the place of recording, that is to say of ‘dead’ or ‘frozen’
communication. According to this traditional approach, the archive
contains everything that has already been communicated.
But we have seen that the digital medium reveals an archive
structure, and this leads us to a circle: the medium is the condition
of communication, since we communicate through the medium;
communication is the condition of registration, since we record what
has been communicated; recording is the condition of the archive, since
what we put in the archive are recordings; the archive is the condition
of the medium, since the digital medium is constituted by databases,
that is to say archives. So the medium is the condition of the archive
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and, at the same time, the archive is the condition of the medium.

To get out of this circle, we must recognise that the medium and the
archive are not two different systems, but rather two different ways of
describing the same system. The medium is the surface of the archive,
the archive is the depth of the medium.

So the medium is not only a communication space, but also a
recording space, and the archive is not only a recording space, but
also a communication space. It is nevertheless useful to use the two
terms in order to distinguish the prevalence of the communicative
function (in the case of the medium) or the prevalence of the recording
function (in the case of the archive). But we must never forget that even
the most transparent medium (such as language) is always based on
physical mediation (voice, memory), and symmetrically even the most
impenetrable archive keeps the possibility of a communication. The
medium is an archive that records for a limited time, the archive is a
medium that communicates over a long period.
3 Vehicle / Store
The distinction between medium and archive relies on a metaphor:
meaning is a commodity that is transported. This main metaphor
entails a series of secondary metaphors: the medium is the vehicle
of meaning and communicating is conveying meaning through the
vehicle (for a recipient who will extract it from the vehicle); the archive
is the store of meaning and to record is to deposit the meaning in the
store (for a user who will extract it from the store).
But the metaphor that meaning is a commodity that is transported
raises a big problem: goods can be transported because they are in
the physical world, but the meaning is in the mind and cannot exist
regardless of it. The most we can do is to act and produce things –
including words, sounds, images – in order to generate meaning in
the minds of others. The metaphor of the transport of meaning is
unsatisfactory, especially for audiovisual objects, which can create
meaning far beyond the intentions of the communicator. Making a
film, for instance, does not consist of putting a message in a bottle, that
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is, in conveying meaning from the mind of the director to the minds
of the spectators. Rather, making a film consists in building a tool
that can produce different affects and meanings for different people.
Even in its metaphorical foundation, the distinction between the
medium and the archive is therefore untenable, because it is above all
the metaphor of meaning as a commodity to be transported that is
untenable. As linguist Michael J. Reddy (1979) points out in his essay
The Conduit Metaphor, this model of communication reifies meaning
in a deceptive and dehumanising way leading us to treat thoughts as
if they had the same kind of external and intersubjective reality as
lamps and tables.

The medium does not directly transmit thoughts. Instead, it allows
us to produce objects that are capable, under the appropriate conditions,
of generating thoughts in the minds of the recipients. Likewise, the
archive does not directly store thoughts. Instead, it store objects that
are capable, under under the appropriate conditions, of generating
thoughts in the minds of the recipients. Therefore, we should turn our
attention to these objects and these conditions.
4 Act / Object
The act of communication is traditionally conceived of as the transport
of meaning through the vehicle, and as well as the recording object
as the box that makes it possible to deposit meaning in the store. Yet,
deconstructing the distinction between the medium and the archive
involves that a work cannot be reduced either to the transport of
meaning or the storage of meaning. Let us consider a film. This cannot
be reduced either to the act of communication or to the recording
object. The film is both an act and an object: an act that is iterated by
objects, and is inseparable act from the objects it has produced. The
film is an act that produces effects as long as its objects persist, just as
the emission of light propagates as long as its rays persist. The film as
an object is the propagation of the film as an act. What we call both
medium and archive is the space of this propagation.
On the side of the medium, one tends to privilege the act and to
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remove the mediation of the object (in particular, as we saw, in the
paradigmatic case of the language). Symmetrically, on the side of the
archive, one tends to focus on the object as if it was separated from the act
that generated it. In both cases, one underestimates something essential:
from the medium’s perspective, one underestimates the relevance of the
material determinations in relation to the communicative intention;
from the archive’s perspective, one underestimates the circumstances of
production and reception in comparison to the existence of the object.

To consider the film as an act rather than an object may seem
odd, but what is really odd is to consider the film exclusively as a
recording object (on the archive side) or to treat it exclusively as an act
of communication (on the side of the medium). New ontologies of art
like those proposed by Gregory Currie (1989), Jerrold Levinson (1990)
and David Davies (2004) highlight that works that have always been
treated as objects should also be treated as acts. In fact, in appreciating
a work, we also appreciate what an agent has done.
Therefore, in the archive, there is more than a merely material object;
there is an object that iterates an act and is capable of eliciting thoughts
precisely because of this. Likewise, in the medium, we do not find a
simple act of transfer of meaning, but also an object to which the act
entrusts the task of eliciting thoughts.

Too rigid conceptions of the medium and the archive break the
essential link between the act of communication and the material
object, but this link is essential to understand what a work really is.
Consider what happens when we watch a film. On the one hand, we are
directly confronted with images and sounds instead of pure thoughts
and intentions. On the other hand, we do not consider these images
and sounds simply for what they are or what they represent; we also
treat them as the outcomes of a communicative act.
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5 Content / Form
We have considered the distinction between the medium and the
archive, just as the metaphor that meaning is a commodity that has
been transported, which is at its root. Among the implications of
these, there is the distinction between the content and the form (or
the content and mode, or content and style, or the signified and the
signifier: too often attempts have been made to solve conceptual
problems by appealing to lexical shifts).
Meaning, as a transported commodity, must be contained in a
container (called from time to time: form, mode of representation,
style or signifier). But if we deconstruct the metaphor of meaning as a
commodity, we also deconstruct the distinction between content and
form. Works like films are not boxes, so they have no content, and no
form either.

A film is rather an act that produces an object that is capable of
eliciting effects. To study a film is to study at the same time the act, the
object and the effects. A film's screenplay, its staging, its cinematography
and its music, its framing and its editing, are all components of the
act that creates the object and produces the effects. We should not
think that something transports and something else is transported:
the different components of the film all have the same ontological
dignity. So, in a film, there is no content to be formatted, transported
and stored. A film is just an act embodied in an object.
Usually, the form / content distinction is applied to works like films
in two different ways. Firstly, one can call ‘content’ the entities to which
the film refers (roughly the narrative information that in fiction films
corresponds to the screenplay), while calling ‘form’ the representation
of this content through images and sounds. In practice, this is just the
distinction between screenwriting and film-making. Yet, on closer
inspection, these is not content to be transported and a form that
contains it; these are just two stages of a production process. Secondly,
one can call ‘content’ the intention of communication of the author and
‘form’ the work that expresses it (by means of both screenwriting and
film-making). Yet, this leads us back to the metaphor of the transport
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of meaning with all its problems. Thus, the distinction between form
and content boils down to a misleading way of expressing the plain truth
that a work like a film is both an intentional act and a material object.
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